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Dealers, the Revenue vs Regulatory
Test, and Recovery, Kale Yeah!:
Uncovering the Scope of Licensing
Requirements Under Georgia’s
Dealers in Agricultural Products
Act *
I. INTRODUCTION
A deal between a shipper from California, unlicensed in Georgia to
deal in agricultural products, and a grower of agricultural products based
in Georgia, specifically for produce like kale and collard greens, turned
sour and ended in a lawsuit.1 Relying on the previously uninterpreted
provisions of Georgia’s Dealers in Agricultural Products Act (the Act),2
potential for abuse by unlicensed dealers in agricultural products was
ripe and ready to harvest.3 In response to three certified questions from
the federal judiciary, the Georgia Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
an exception to the license requirement for agricultural products dealers,
holding that license registration under the Act is required for the purpose
of regulating in the interest of the public and unlicensed dealers may not
sue to enforce contracts to carry out business regulated under the act.4
The shipper, an agricultural products dealer based in California, tried to
enforce a contract for the sale of goods in Georgia.5 This dealer allegedly

* I would like to thank Professor Stephen Johnson for his guidance while serving as my
faculty advisor. Additionally, I would like to thank Madison Crymes, Laney Ivey, and Hary
Janos for their faithful support.
1 San Miguel Produce, Inc. v. L.G. Herndon Jr. Farms, Inc., 308 Ga. 812, 843 S.E.2d 403
(2020).
2 O.C.G.A. §§ 2-9-1 to 2-9-16 (2020).
3 See generally San Miguel, 308 Ga. 812, 843 S.E.2d 403.
4 Id. at 812–14, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
5 Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
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violated the Act because the dealer did not hold a dealer in agricultural
products license in Georgia.6 To resolve the claims brought forth by the
parties, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia needed to interpret several provisions of the Act which had not
been previously interpreted by Georgia’s appellate courts.7
Deep-rooted concepts regarding licensure in Georgia under a statute
enacted to regulate in the public interest were the focus of the three
certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court.8 These questions
prompted the court to apply well-established precedent dating back to
the late-1800s to a modern scenario by putting a new spin on
well-recognized concepts.9 The first question focused on the scope of an
exception to the Act and led the court to examine the purposes of the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA),10 the Act’s federal
counterpart.11 The second question addressed whether the Act was a
revenue raising statute or a regulatory statute in the public interest.12
The third question examined whether a dealer who fails to obtain a
license can recover on a contract to carry out business regulated by the
Act.13
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
San Miguel Produce Inc. (San Miguel) and L. G. Herndon Jr. Farms
(Herndon Farms) entered into multiple agreements regarding
agriculture in September 2014. One specific agreement was the “GrowerShipper Agreement” (GSA). Herndon Farms, a Georgia corporation, was
responsible for growing and supplying the produce ordered by San Miguel
under the GSA. Herndon Farms agreed to complement orders with crops
from other growers if it could not meet the demand for produce by San
Miguel under the GSA. San Miguel agreed to purchase Herndon Farms’
produce. The GSA required Herndon Farms to deliver the produce to a
packing and processing facility located in South Georgia, ROBO Produce,
LLC (ROBO), owned jointly by San Miguel and Herndon Farms.14

Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
8 See generally San Miguel, 308 Ga. 812, 843 S.E.2d 403.
9 Id. at 818–21, 843 S.E.2d at 408–10.
10 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s.
11 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 813–15, 843 S.E.2d at 405–06.
12 Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 405–06.
6
7
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The GSA stipulated that the agreement “shall be construed pursuant
to and in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia.”15 At no time
during the agreement did San Miguel obtain a Georgia agricultural
products dealer license. When Herndon Farms was not able to deliver
sufficient produce to meet San Miguel’s demands, San Miguel started
sending its own produce to the ROBO facility from California.16
Herndon Farms and San Miguel terminated their business
relationship in February 2016.17 San Miguel filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against Herndon
Farms for breach of the GSA and Herndon Farms filed, in the Superior
Court of Toombs County, a separate action against San Miguel for breach
of the GSA.18 This latter action was removed to federal court, and the
actions were consolidated.19 Both parties filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment.20 The district court noted that the case turned upon
the application of Georgia law to the GSA.21 The district court certified
three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the scope of the
Act.22 The supreme court unanimously answered the three certified
questions.23
The first question focused on whether an entity that purchases
produce, processes it, then markets, sells, and ships the produce qualifies
as a dealer in agricultural products or meets an exception under the Act
because the entity occasionally grows the produce that it sells.24 The
supreme court held that under O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1),25 this type of
entity does qualify under the Act as a dealer in agricultural products and
does not fit the exemption.26 The Act exempts specific transactions, not
the dealer as a whole, if the dealer supplies the produce it has grown.27
The second question addressed whether the Act was enacted to raise
revenue or regulate in the public interest.28 As to the second question,
the supreme court held that the licensing requirements of the Act are
Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 406.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 815, 843 S.E.2d at 406.
22 Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
23 Id. at 813–14, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
24 Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
25 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1) (2020).
26 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 813–14, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
27 Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
28 Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
15
16
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regulatory in the public interest and not a mere revenue raising
measure.29 Lastly, the third question discussed whether a dealer can
recover on a contract to carry out business regulated under the Act if that
dealer fails to obtain a license.30 The court held that if a dealer fails to
acquire a license under the Act, the dealer may not recover under a
contract that relates to the Act.31
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Certified Question One: Farmers in the Sale of Agricultural Products
Grown by Themselves
Since the passage of the Georgia Dealers in Agricultural Products Act
in 1956, only one other case has interpreted the provisions of the Act.32
However, modeled on a prior federal law, the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act of 1930 (PACA), Georgia’s Act is occasionally called the
“Mini-PACA.”33
1. Georgia’s Mini-PACA34
The Act manages transactions between dealers and producers of
agricultural products in Georgia.35 The provisions of the Act implement
a mechanism for the licensing of dealers in agricultural products and
regulate the formulation of contracts by those dealers in Georgia.36 A
“dealer in agricultural products,” as defined by O.C.G.A. § 2-9-1(2),37 is
required to hold a valid license from the Commissioner of Agriculture38
before transacting in Georgia as an agricultural dealer.39 The Act has an
exception, O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1), which states that the Act does not

Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 813, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
31 Id. at 814, 843 S.E.2d at 405.
32 Classic Harvest LLC v. Freshworks LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82470, 2017 WL
2350212 (2017) (holding that not having a valid license under the Act does not prevent
recovery under PACA).
33 D. Richard Jones III & Greg B. Walling, A Produce Debtor’s Nightmare; A Produce
Creditor’s Dream: Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 4 Ga. Bar Journal 20 (Feb.
1999).
34 Id. (informal name for the Act).
35 O.C.G.A. §§ 2-9-1 to 2-9-16.
36 Id.
37 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-1(2) (2020).
38 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-3 (2020).
39 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-2 (2020).
29
30
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apply to farmers selling agricultural products grown by themselves.40
Once approved, the applicant must pay the license fee in the amount
determined by the Department of Agriculture and the applicant must
submit a surety bond.41 The maximum amount of the licensing fee is
$400,42 and the bond amount ranges from $10,000 to $230,000.43 The
Commissioner will then grant the license after the dealer meets these
requirements.44
Under the Act, dealers must keep records of shipments, and if disputes
arise the statute creates mechanisms for dispute resolution through
inspections by the Department of Agriculture.45 The final provisions of
the Act make violation of a provision of the Act a misdemeanor.46
2. PACA
Codified in 1930, PACA provides a licensing system used for the
interstate shipping of perishable agricultural commodities.47 Predating
Georgia’s Act, PACA provides penalties for violations of its provisions.48
The United States Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for authorizing,
monitoring, revoking, or suspending licenses for brokers and dealers that
meet (or fail to meet) the requirements for licensure.49 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Kornblum & Co.,50
addressed the purpose of PACA. Congress enacted PACA to promote
financial responsibility as well as to prevent unfair business practices in

40 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1). The Department of Agriculture has the discretion to approve
or deny applications for licenses if the applicant has committed a disqualifying act. O.C.G.A.
§ 2-9-7 (2020). The Commissioner may suspend, revoke, or decline to grant a license if the
applicant has (1) suffered a money judgment against his where an unsatisfied execution
has been returned, (2) made false charges for services, (3) failed to properly account or make
settlements with a producer, (4) made false statements about the condition, quality, or
quantity of goods when he could have known the true condition, quality, or quantity upon
reasonable inspection, (5) made a false or misleading statement relating to service or
market conditions, (6) been guilty of fraud in attempting obtain a license, or (7) directly or
indirectly sold agricultural products for his own account without authority from the
consigning producer. Id.
41 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-4 (2020) (license fee); O.C.G.A. § 2-9-5 (2020) (surety bond).
42 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-4.
43 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-5.
44 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-4. However, the option for revocation by the Commissioner still
remains for the duration of the license. Id.
45 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-11 (2020).
46 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-16 (2020).
47 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s.
48 7 U.S.C. §§ 499b(5).
49 7 U.S.C. §§ 499b–499d.
50 81 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the interstate business of shipping perishable agricultural
commodities.51 Congress has amended PACA and provided for more
protection to produce suppliers.52
3. Similarities Between Georgia’s Act and PACA
Enacted around the same time period, both Georgia’s Act and PACA
attack the problem of dealers seizing unfair opportunities to take
advantage of growers of agricultural products.53 Though differences exist
between the two acts, the similarities in their structure, purpose, and
definitional sections led the Georgia Supreme Court to examine the
federal law to interpret the state law in this case.54
B. Certified Question Two: Regulatory versus Revenue
To answer the second certified question, the court applied the rule
outlined in Paulsen St. Investors v. Ebco Gen. Agencies55 to the Act.56 For
over one hundred years, Georgia’s appellate courts have articulated and
built upon previous rules pertaining to the purpose of licenses to set forth
the rule in Paulsen St. Investors.57 The rule states:
[W]here a statute provides that persons proposing to engage in a
certain business shall procure a license before being authorized to do
so, and where it appears from the terms of the statute that it was
enacted not merely as a revenue measure but was intended as a
regulation of such business in the interest of the public, contracts
made in violation of such statute are void and unenforceable.58

This rule applies to statutes across different industries that share the
common purpose of regulating in the interest of the public.59
1. Earliest Definitions of the Test for License Purpose
The Georgia Supreme Court has issued multiple decisions since the
late 1800s exploring licensing statutes to determine if they are merely
revenue-based or are regulatory in nature. Decided in 1875, Taliaferro v.

Id. at 283.
Id.
53 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s; O.C.G.A. §§ 2-9-1 to 2-9-16 (2020).
54 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 815, 843 S.E.2d at 406.
55 237 Ga. App. 116, 514 S.E.2d 904 (1999).
56 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 818, 843 S.E.2d at 408.
57 Paulsen St. Investors, 237 Ga. App. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906.
58 Id.
59 Id.
51
52
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Moffett60 was the first case in a line of decisions to address this subject.61
Pertaining to the licensure for pharmacists and apothecaries, the
supreme court provided a general rule in Taliaferro that separated
statutes created for the purpose of protecting the public from statutes
enacted for purely revenue purposes.62 Because Georgia law provided
that a violation of a statute requiring licensure to protect the public
renders contracts created under and through that statute void, the court
clarified the distinction between revenue-based and regulatory
statutes.63 In the law at issue in Taliaferro, to determine whether the
license at issue was for a revenue or regulatory purpose, the court focused
on the requirements for obtaining pharmacist and apothecary licenses.64
These requirements included recordkeeping and passing an exam
administered by the respective certifying school.65 The court also focused
on the fact that the statute included provisions outlining penalties for
non-compliance.66 By considering these requirements and provisions, the
court decided that the purpose of this licensing statute was to protect the
public.67
Interpreting the revenue or regulatory-based question, the Georgia
Supreme Court, in Toole v. Wiregrass Development Co.,68 held that a real
estate licensing statute was enacted for the purpose of increasing
revenue.69 While noting the location of the statute70 in the Georgia
Political Code, under the title “Public Revenue,” the court also noted that
the penalty for failure to obtain a license was a misdemeanor, or merely
a way to enforce the payment of the penalty, but did not extend to
rendering the contract void.71 The statute did not expressly or impliedly

54 Ga. 150 (1875).
Murray v. Williams, 121 Ga. 63, 48 S.E. 686 (1904); Planters Fertilizer Co. v. Wheeler,
142 Ga. 153, 82 S.E. 564 (1914); Toole v. Wiregrass Dev. Co., 142 Ga. 57, 82 S.E. 514 (1914);
Mgmt. Search, Inc. v. Kinard, 231 Ga. 26, 199 S.E.2d 899 (1973); Paulsen St., 237 Ga. App.
116, 514 S.E.2d 904.
62 Taliaferro, 54 Ga. at 153 (“[W]here the license required by the statute is for the
protection of the public, and to prevent improper persons from acting in a particular
capacity, and is not for revenue purposes only, the imposition of the penalty amounts to a
positive prohibition of a contract made in violation of the statute.”).
63 Id. at 153.
64 Id. at 152.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 153.
67 Id.
68 142 Ga. 57, 82 S.E. 514 (1914).
69 Id. at 65.
70 Ga. Pol. Code §§ 971, 978 (1914).
71 Toole, 142 Ga. at 65.
60
61
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mention that a violation of the statute makes the contract void.72 These
reasons led the court to hold that the statute was created for the purpose
of revenue creation and, therefore, was enforceable by the party not
complying with the licensing requirements.73
2. The Search for Purpose
In continuing the discussion of the distinction between a
revenue-based and a regulatory purpose, the Georgia Court of Appeals in
McLamb v. Phillips,74 applied the general rule laid out in Taliaferro and
further defined in Toole when it examined a licensing statute requiring
licenses for any business that makes loans on wages or salaries.75 The
court focused on the purpose of the statute in question, Georgia Civil
Code §§ 3446–3465,76 when it held that because the statute’s licensing
fee was not purely nominal, the statute was enacted to regulate in the
public interest.77 The statute did not include an express penalty for not
obtaining the license, but the purpose of the statute, to protect persons
who borrow money from irresponsible money dealers, greatly contributed
to the holding that this statute was not enacted for revenue purposes.78
Holding that the business of wage brokers or money lenders was “a
business public in its nature,” and the people involved in the business
were susceptible to extortion and unfair dealings if the money lenders
remained unchecked, the court identified the nature of the industry to
which the licensing statute applied as being a relevant factor for
consideration.79 The court held that the express language coupled with
the apparent purpose and related industry of the statute rendered a
contract made without the license void and unenforceable.80

72 Id. at 65. “Statutes seldom express any intention regarding the enforceability of
contracts in so many words.” 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.2. The intention of the
legislature is gleaned from inferences resting on the purpose, harms and evils, and fines for
noncompliance. Many courts will use a balancing test between these factors if doubt
remains. Id.
73 Id. at 64. This holding is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
states that a contract is not enforceable if the purpose of the licensing is for regulating in
the public interest and not just for revenue purposes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 181 (1981).
74 34 Ga. App. 210, 129 S.E. 570 (1925).
75 Id. at 214, 129 S.E. at 572; Taliaferro, 54 Ga. at 153; Toole, 142 Ga. at 60–63, 82 S.E.
at 514.
76 Ga. Civ. Code §§ 3446–3465 (1910).
77 McLamb, 34 Ga. App. at 214, 129 S.E. at 572.
78 Id. at 214–15, 129 S.E. at 572.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 216, 129 S.E. at 573.
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To more effectively find the intentions of the legislature as to the
purpose behind a licensing statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in
Bernstein v. Peters,81 noted the name of the implicated act.82 The title, the
“Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and
Liquors,”83 concerned regulation and control of the liquor industry,
further leading the court to hold that the statute was regulatory in the
public interest.84 The court analyzed the individual statutory code
provisions and examined the role of the State Revenue Commissioner
throughout the statute to uncover the amount of control the
commissioner had over the enforcement, issuing, and revocation of
licenses.85 The industry involved in Bernstein was the liquor business,
and the court recognized that the liquor industry was “freighted with a
peril to the public welfare.”86 Thus, the court concluded that the
requirement of licensing in the liquor industry was not merely for the
purpose of revenue, but for regulating the public interest.87 The appellate
court focused on the type of industry regulated as an indication of
whether the legislature intended the statute to be enacted for a revenue
raising or regulatory purpose.88
Georgia’s appellate courts have identified licenses created for the
purpose of regulating the public interest in industries other than
healthcare, employment, and liquor; for example, the Georgia Supreme
Court in Conley v. Sims & Blalock89 noted protection of Georgia’s farmers
as imperative to prevent fraud in the fertilizer industry.90 The Georgia
Supreme Court analyzed the requirements for the sale of fertilizer and
noted that the Commissioner of Agriculture must inspect the product as
well as check that the seller fully complied with the law before the
fertilizer is sold.91 Furthermore, in Johnston Bros. & Co. v. McConnell,92
Georgia’s farmers were considered “one of [Georgia’s] greatest interests,”

68 Ga. App. 218, 22 S.E.2d 614 (1942).
Id. at 221, 22 S.E.2d at 616.
83 Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages (Ga. L. Ex. Sess., 19371938. P. 103).
84 Bernstein, 68 Ga. App. at 221, 22 S.E.2d at 616.
85 Id. at 221–23, 22 S.E.2d at 616–17.
86 Id. at 221, 22 S.E.2d at 616.
87 Id. at 223, 22 S.E.2d at 617.
88 Id.
89 71 Ga. 161 (1883).
90 Id. at 162–63.
91 Id. at 162.
92 65 Ga. 129 (1880).
81
82
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and protecting this subset of the public was, therefore, considered the
intention of the legislature behind the statute.93
By applying the plain meaning of the text in the Act, the Georgia
Supreme Court held in Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard94 that the
intentions of the legislature were clear.95 Through the consistently
textualist approach taken by the Georgia Supreme Court, the court held
that the statute in question, former O.C.G.A. §§ 84-4101 et seq., the
Private Employment Agencies Act96 was unambiguously enacted to
regulate and protect the public.97 Because the Act required “more than
the mere obtaining of a business license,” and the plain meaning of the
statute clearly showed the purpose of the statute was to protect the
public, using the uncovered purpose of the statute, the court found the
statute to regulate in the public interest.98
3. Paulsen St. Investors v. Ebco Gen. Agencies
The court of appeals continued applying the general rule that
originated in Taliaferro for over one hundred years before coming to the
decision in Paulsen Street Investors.99 The court noted the role of the
Insurance Commissioner in granting the licenses under the statute at
issue, the Insurance Premium Finance Company Act,100 as well as the
qualifications required for the licensees to obtain the licenses and for
license revocation.101 The rule expressed in Paulsen Street Investors is a
culmination of centuries of adjudication by the courts of appellate review
in Georgia to reach a concise and applicable rule pertaining to the
outcome of holding a licensing statute as not revenue-raising but
regulatory in the public interest.102

Id. at 131.
231 Ga. 26, 199 S.E.2d 899 (1973).
95 Id. at 28, 199 S.E.2d at 901.
96 Ga. H. R. Bill 19, Reg. Sess. (1959).
97 Mgmt. Systems, Inc., 231 Ga. at 28, 199 S.E.2d at 901.
98 Id.
99 Paulsen Street Investors, 237 Ga. App. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906 (citing Bowers v.
Howell, 203 Ga. App. 636, 636–37, 417 S.E.2d 392, 393 (1992)).
100 O.C.G.A. §§ 33-22-1 through 33-22-16 (2020).
101 Paulsen Street Investors, 237 Ga. App. at 118–19, 514 S.E.2d at 906.
102 Id. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906 (“under well-established Georgia law”).
93
94
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C. Question Three: Recovery
A party seeking to recover from a contract created under a statute
requiring a party to hold a license for regulatory, not revenue, purposes
must prove it held the license to recover.103
1. The Civil Practice Act of 1966104
Prior to the Civil Practice Act of 1966, the supreme court recognized in
Murray v. Williams105 that even without express language in the statute
voiding recovery for services rendered without a license, if the legislature
passed the statute with the intention to protect the public interest, the
statute bars recovery for claims relating to the unlicensed action.106 The
court of appeals, in Hale v. Chatham,107 held that failure to allege that a
party was licensed, when this fact was necessary under the statute
involved, resulted in a dismissal of the claim.108 Since the broker did not
allege that he was legally licensed, the case was subject to general
demurrer.109 The court of appeals consistently applied this rule to the
real estate broker trying to recover on a listings contract by dismissing
the claim.110
The passage of the Civil Practice Act of 1966 altered how license
allegations were treated and applied for the purposes of recovery.111
Under the Civil Practice Act of 1966, for a party to recover on a claim or
a contract under a statute mandating the holding of a license, the license
would have to be shown and obtained to acquire recovery.112 The Georgia
Court of Appeals in Maxwell v. Tucker noted the differences between
before and after the Civil Practice Act of 1966.113 Failure to allege the
existence of the license would not affect the validity of the claim but
would prevent recovery on the claim.114 Because of the Civil Practice Act
of 1966, the supreme court held, in Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard,
to recover under the contract, a party must show he holds a license even

Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-81(a) to 11-109 (2020); Ga. H. R. Bill 6, Reg. Sess. (1966).
105 121 Ga. 63, 48 S.E. 686 (1904).
106 Id. at 64, 48 S.E. at 686.
107 91 Ga. App. 519, 86 S.E.2d 536 (1955).
108 Id. at 519–20, 86 S.E.2d at 537.
109 Id. at 520, 86 S.E.2d at 537.
110 Id.
111 Maxwell v. Tucker, 118 Ga. App. 695, 698, 165 S.E.2d 459, 461–62 (1968).
112 Id. at 698, 165 S.E.2d at 461–62.
113 Id.
114 Id.
103
104
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if this requirement is not expressly stated in the statute.115 Under the
new obligations of the Civil Practice Act of 1966, proving the holding of a
license is a requirement for recovery under a statute mandating the
existence of a license.116
The rule in Paulsen Street Investors instructs that when a statute
requires a party to obtain a license and the statute is created to regulate
the public interest, not create revenue, a party seeking to recover from a
contract created under the statute must prove it held the license to
enforce the claim.117 The rule in Paulsen Street Investors is a culmination
of holdings influenced by the passage of the Civil Practice Act of 1966.118
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
A. Certified Question One: Farmers in the Sale of Agricultural Products
Grown by Themselves
Justice Boggs answered the first certified question in San Miguel by
initially considering the language contained in the statute at issue.119
The supreme court examined the text of both O.C.G.A. § 2-9-1(2) for the
definition of “dealer in agricultural products”120 and O.C.G.A.
§ 2-9-15(a)(1) for the rule that “farmers or groups of farmers in the sale
of agricultural products grown by themselves,”121 to determine the scope
of the application of the exemption.122 Applying the plain language of the
Act, the court held that the exemption only applied “‘in the sale’” of the
products.123 The court noted that the Georgia General Assembly
distinguished between the business of dealers in agricultural products
and specific sales of the dealer’s own product.124 Relying on authorities
such as Deal v. Coleman125 to strengthen the finding of the plain meaning
definition of the language at issue, the court noted that it must “read the
statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way.”126

Mgmt. Search, Inc., 231 Ga. at 28–29, 199 S.E.2d at 901–02.
Id.
117 Paulsen Street Investors, 237 Ga. App. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906.
118 Id.
119 San Miguel, 308 Ga. 816–17, 843 S.E.2d at 407.
120 O.C.G.A § 2-9-1(2).
121 O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1).
122 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 816, 843 S.E.2d at 407.
123 Id. at 818, 843 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 2-9-15(a)(1)).
124 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 817, 843 S.E.2d at 407.
125 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).
126 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 816, 843 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Deal, 294 Ga. at 172, 752
S.E.2d at 341).
115
116
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Relying on the amicus brief submitted by the Georgia Department of
Agriculture,127 the court further pointed out that its interpretation of the
Act in this question was consistent with the definition of “dealer” in
PACA.128 The court noted similarities and differences between PACA and
Georgia’s Act, while also clarifying the goals of both PACA and the Act:
to prevent a dealer from taking advantage of the system.129 The court
noted that if the exception that San Miguel was seeking was valid, any
dealer could evade the requirements of the Act simply by growing and
then selling a small amount of their agricultural product.130 This
interpretation could lead to exploitation and eventually could erode the
safeguards put in place by the Act.131 Limiting the exception in O.C.G.A.
§ 2-9-15(a)(1) to only exempting the specific transaction, not the dealer,
prevents the noted harm, and adheres to the plain meaning of the statute
as enacted by the General Assembly.132
B. Certified Question Two: Regulatory versus Revenue
To answer the district court’s second certified question regarding
whether the Act was enacted for regulatory or revenue purposes, the
supreme court turned to the text of the statute.133 The court concluded
from the text of the statute, the inclusion of a comprehensive plan, the
oversight by the Department of Agriculture, the potential for criminal
penalties, the bond requirements, and authorization for injunctive relief
in the statutory text, that the statute was a regulatory statute.134
To support its holding, the court focused on the long history behind
the rule articulated in Paulsen Street Investors, the rule referenced in the
certified question by the district court.135 The analysis of this line of
decisions, including the decisions of Taliaferro, Toole, Mgmt. Search, Inc.,
and Planters Fertilizer, highlighted the changes, additions, and
applications from 1875 to the present day when the court analyzed these

127 Brief of the Georgia Department of Agriculture as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, 2020 GA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1091, San Miguel v. Herndon Farms, 308 Ga.
812, 843 S.E.2d 403 (2020).
128 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 817, 843 S.E.2d at 407–08.
129 Id. at 817, 843 S.E.2d at 408.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 818, 843 S.E.2d at 408.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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past rules in making its decision under these facts.136 The court applied
the long history of caselaw to show the consistency of the rule over time
and to show that the application in the present case fit with a heavily
established precedent.137
Challenging San Miguel’s contention that farmers are not the
“public,” the court held that the revenue-versus-regulatory test had
previously been applied by the supreme court to farmers.138 The court
applied the rule from Johnston to show how the rule in Paulsen Street
Investors previously affected agricultural subjects, like protecting the
public from unregulated fertilizers.139 The court noted that farmers are
an important part of Georgia’s public, and agriculture makes up a
significant portion of Georgia’s economy.140 The court compared PACA’s
protection of the nation’s farmers and agricultural dealers noted in the
purpose of PACA to the protection of Georgia’s farmers found in the
Act.141 Noting the Act’s purpose to regulate in the public interest, the
court held that the Act was not enacted for raising revenue.142
C. Certified Question Three: Recovery
To answer the third certified question, the court first applied the
general rule summarized in Paulsen Street Investors.143 For a party to
enforce and recover under a contract, when a statute requires a party to
hold a license prior to forming a contract to engage in a specific type of
business, if the statute is enacted to regulate that business in the public
interest and not only as a revenue measure, the party must show they
obtained and held the license before forming the contract.144 The court
noted the application of this rule over the years in multiple cases to show
how it had changed, as well as to illustrate the aspects that continuously
stayed the same.145

136 Id. at 818–20, 843 S.E.2d at 408–09; Taliaferro, 54 Ga. at 153; Toole, 142 Ga. at 61;
Mgmt. Search, Inc., 231 Ga. at 28, 199 S.E.2d at 901.; Planters Fertilizer Co., 142 Ga. at
155, 82 S.E. at 564.
137 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 820, 843 S.E.2d at 409.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 820–21, 843 S.E.2d at 409–10.
142 Id. at 821, 843 S.E.2d at 410.
143 Id.
144 Id. (citing Paulsen Street Investors, 237 Ga. App. at 118, 514 S.E.2d at 906.).
145 San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 821, 843 S.E.2d at 410 (noting how the “long-standing rule
has been applied to numerous statutes governing professions and trades”) (citing Padgett
v. Silver Lake Park Corp., 168 Ga. 759, 762–63, 149 S.E. 180 (1929)).
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The court ended its analysis by noting that the legislature may
change the statute to include an express voiding provision or an
alteration of another nature, but amending the statute is up to the
discretion of the legislature.146 San Miguel’s argument that the rule from
Paulsen Street Investors was outdated and irrelevant was rejected by the
court.147 The court noted that the body of law used for answering the
certified question was consistent and valid precedent for the court to
follow.148 Even in the absence of an express provision in the statute
prohibiting recovery for lack of holding a license, the court held that a
contract could be void by implication.149
V. IMPLICATIONS
The perishable agricultural products industry is volatile and ripe
with a sense of urgency to sell products before expiration unique to the
industry. Perishable goods have risen in prominence for trade by the U.S.
thanks to technology increases.150 The rushed timetable that these
farmers are placed on underscores every transaction made. Technology
increases from the 1950s to present day have expanded markets to
include a global reach, but with this expanded market comes more
problems of control.
By narrowing the scope of the exception to the Act, the supreme court
tightened Georgia’s control over dealers both in state and out of state by
restricting the circumstances that would fall under the exception to being
licensed. Only specific transactions of goods grown by the dealer may be
unlicensed instead of dealers as a whole who also grow their own
products. Georgia’s agriculture industry has changed over the decades
since the original enactment of the Act in 1950. During this time,
agriculture has remained an industry of prominence in the state;151
however, changes in technology and increased technological dependence
have altered how farming and agriculture look.152 Business structures
and contracts may have become more complex and extensive, but the

San Miguel, 308 Ga. at 822, 843 S.E.2d at 410.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Anita Regmi, Changing Structure of Global Food Consumption and Trade, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE AND TRADE REPORT, 1 (2001).
151
GEORGIA
FARM
BUREAU:
ABOUT
GEORGIA
AGRICULTURE,
http://www.gfb.org/education-and-outreach/about-ga-agriculture.cms (last visited Mar. 23,
2021).
152 See Erik j. O’Donoghue et al., The Changing Organization of U.S. Farming, USDA,
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 88 (Dec. 2011).
146
147
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application, the tests, and the protections for farmers remain
unwavering.153
Answering certified questions of first impression by applying a line of
relevant cases spanning back over one hundred years shows regularity
in the court system. The Georgia Supreme Court’s reliance on the
analysis produced in the brief of the Georgia Department of Agriculture
as amicus curiae in support of neither party shows the deference the
court gives to the Department of Agriculture in questions regarding
agricultural licensing.154 By explicitly stating how the agency has
interpreted the language at issue in the Act when applying it to
applicants or offenders, the Department of Agriculture gave the court
clear guidelines showing how the agency has not only applied the
statutes in the past but on what grounds the agency will analyze
circumstances for licensing purposes in the future.155 The court did not
have to adhere to the interpretations and findings of the Department of
Agriculture, but because the relevant caselaw aligned consistently with
the findings in the Department of Agriculture’s brief, the judiciary
achieved consistency between the legislature’s statute and a department
of the executive’s interpretation of enforcement requirements.156
Because the Department of Agriculture did not weigh in on the
specific facts of the case, per its silence in answering Question Three, and
the court’s comparison of the Act to PACA, the application and the
reasoning promoted by both the court and the Department of Agriculture
show that the answers to these questions are not based just on the facts
of the case but with the protection of farmers as well as consumers in
mind. 157 Protecting against abuse from unlicensed dealers by narrowing
the licensing exception under the Act exercises the control and regulatory
power of the Department of Agriculture regarding licensing statute
interpretation.

E. Tate Crymes

O’Donoghue et al., supra note 148, at 69–70.
See Brief from the Georgia Department of Agriculture as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Neither Party, 2020 GA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1091, San Miguel v. Herndon Farms, 308
Ga. 812, 843 S.E.2d 403.
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